Abstract: Internet-enabled technologies are said to allow individuals to consume, create and distribute their own content without governmental control. They also provide opportunities for new forms of activism and mobilisation that can challenge repressive governments. Recent reports on citizens' mobilisation in authoritarian states suggest that the Internet can generate new forms of opposition against totalitarian rules. The aim of this paper is to examine whether these new technologies can be regarded as vehicles of democracy or instruments of authoritarianism. Can Internet-enabled technologies promote values of openness and freedom that gradually and significantly act as anti-totalitarian tools?
There is no doubt that Information and Communication Technologies have changed the way people communicate, connect with each other, create and distribute content. A discourse has been initiated regarding the positive and negative aspects of these new media. On the one hand, questions have been raised about how these new internet-enabled technologies assist the construction of totalitarian structures within the state, and on the other, emphasis has been given to their potential to promote democratic processes. The recent demonstrations across Egypt have been facilitated by the use of social media to a great extent. The enabling power of these social media in the context of these protests enjoyed a long coverage in various news reports and commentaries.
Can the Internet become the promising network that charts the path towards democracy? Or is there a less hopeful relation between the Internet and totalitarianism that results in less democratic structures and practices?
Starting with the debate on the relation between Internet and totalitarianism, this paper aims at examining whether the new technologies can be regarded as instruments of democratisation. The paper neither exhausts the debate on totalitarianism nor does it characterise particular states as "totalitarian". Instead, it seeks to identify whether the recent reports on citizens' activism within authoritarian states or under unpopular regimes suggest that the new media can act as effective tools of democratisation.
By taking into consideration the influential scholarly studies on totalitarianism (Arendt 1967; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1966; Friedrich 1969; Linz 2000) as well as the scholarly rejections of the term-e.g. for methodological reasons-this paper does not label particular states as "totalitarian". The use of the term "authoritarian" is preferred in order to characterise states, in which certain policies, practices and behaviours challenge their characterisation as "democratic".
It can be argued that the Internet is likely to construct a non-open society that shares similarities to the Orwellian social structure (Orwell 1949) , by enabling new surveillance methods that empower both governmental agencies and corporations to constantly watch and monitor the citizens.
The controversial role of the Internet as providing new methods of surveillance is laid upon its power to ensure the security of the citizens while enabling the violation of privacy at the same time. This dyadic role is captured in Lyon's definition of surveillance as encompassing both elements of care and elements of control (Lyon 2001, 3) . Access to personal data is an integral part of the state's security agenda and it can produce a disputable rhetoric pertaining to the protection and security of the citizens. The justification of such access needs to be further examined on the basis of the legislative and constitutional framework that enables it and regulates it.
In addition, the collection of personal data may also be the result of modern consumerism, when systematically conducted by private companies that provide goods and services online. Whether online consumerism gives rise to such "modern" surveillance needs further examination; it should be noted however that such "modern" surveillance is likely to emerge in liberal economic systems that invite and support online consumerism. In any event, monitoring of citizens and their activities is a topic closely related to broader thinking about power (Chadwick 2006, 259) .
This need to contemplate power becomes more intense when such monitoring takes place for political reasons. The way political power is exercised by using modern technologies in order to enable the control of citizens and to spread propaganda raises an interesting question: Can useful analogies be drawn between Orwell's descriptions of the Big Brother Society-as it derives from the examination of Nazi and Soviet forms of government-and contemporary societies? "Orwell's insidious telescreen device, which simultaneously monitors and communicates propaganda, can be read as a metaphor for the contemporary Internet" (ibid., 260). Chadwick himself though calls for a deeper examination of the issue, suggesting that this model may be quite narrow in capturing the global context of the Internet. Totalitarian regimes like the aforementioned ones made use of the available media to spread propaganda, initiate censorship and promote and sustain particular ideologies necessary for the sustainment of "order". The monopoly of power 1 , the rejection of toleration and pluralism and the constant observation of citizens' activities were central practices in fascist and Stalinist types of government. But the mere assumption that the modern technologies can construct an analogous environment, in which propaganda and control are at the epicentre, requires sufficient evidence and validation. What needs to be questioned for the purpose of this paper is: first, whether modern censorship techniques as enabled nowadays by the Internet empower authoritarian rule, i.e. the Internet as servant of authoritarianism; and second, whether the Internet, instead of serving the authoritarian regimes, opens up multiple ways towards the opposite direction, i.e. whether it limits authoritarian control and becomes an agent of democracy.
When Winston examines the impact of the Information revolution upon society he states, "…Instead of validating Orwell's vision of Big Brother watching the citizen, the third revolution [of the Information Age] enables the citizen to watch Big Brother" (Wriston 1997, 172) . He goes on to argue that freedom is spread around the world by electronic networks. It follows that Wriston does not only take an optimistic view towards the power of the Internet to act as freedom mechanism, but he also presents the promising assumption that the democratic power of this tool can outweigh its "totalitarian"potential.
How useful is this assumption in the context of contemporary states that-although they cannot be characterised as "totalitarian" 2 -are labelled as "authoritarian" 3 and "nondemocratic"? How can the citizens act against censorship practices that take place in states where the free flow of information is systematically traumatised?
Last year, Hilary Clinton proclaimed that the Internet has a close connection to freedom and human rights. She drew a parallel between the Iron Curtain and the Information Curtain (referring to China) and emphasised the digital divide between the connected and non-connected world (Clinton 2010) . What is worth noting for our purposes is first, the recognition that the Internet plays a significant role in promoting democracy; and second, that if China continues to impose restrictions upon free access to information, it will risk "walling themselves off from the progress of the next century" (ibid.).
This Cold War narrative and metaphor may well be accommodated in the broader agenda of US foreign policy regarding the promotion of democracy and human rights. In addition, it is exactly this metaphor that reminds us of a possible Wall that stands nowadays between the states that promote free access to information and those that systematically-although not always directly-violate the right to information and free access to the new media. It would be inappropriate to proceed to an abstract, non-tested correlation between free access to information and democracy. Although freedom of information and of the press is associated with consolidated democratic forms, the mere existence of access to information cannot be considered as a sign of unquestioned democracy. However, systematic or less systematic propaganda and censorship are traditionally connected with authoritarian forms of government. A closer look at recent daily press and scholarly writings reveals the authoritarian behaviour of particular states nowadays, when it comes to the Internet and social media.
Tapscott and Williams-who believe that states like China, Iran and Russia enjoy today more freedom than in the past-claim that "…today's despots have recognized that absolute control 4 over information and economic activity is neither possible nor necessary" (Tapscott, Williams 2010, 323) . Although these states now enjoy more freedom than what they did under Mao, Khomeini or Stalin respectively, there are still cases implying certain degrees of censorship and information control.
Deibert refers especially to the escalation of online censorship when claiming that, although in 2002 China, Iran and Saudi Arabia were the best known countries conducting such censorship, in 2007 twenty-six out of forty countries under examination were identified as practicing some Internet filtration practices (Deibert 2009, 327) . In China, Internet Police monitor people's online comments to make sure they are in line with the Party's views. The Chinese Fifty Per Cent Party sustains a "special security" force comprised of official controllers of online content with the aim to promote the views and ideas of the dominant Party. The riots in Urumqui in 2009 were followed by the decision of the Chinese government to temporarily block social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter.
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Of course, there are further examples 6 of online censorship. Studies that also focus on Internet control in the Arab world suggest that the free flow of information and openness is also restricted there, when authoritarian governments take measures against the free use of network tools. The most recent example at the time of writing this paper is Egypt and the efforts of Mubarak's 7 government to control social tools like Facebook and Twitter, which used by the protesters to co-ordinate their networking actions. The censorship techniques employed by governments cannot be exhausted in this paper. It would be useful though to mention that authoritarian governments can move forward: in addition to acting online by filtering, controlling and scrutinising online content, they can also act offline by proceeding to punishment. A recent example refers to a Chinese woman who was arrested and jailed in November 2010 for posting on Twitter a message against the "social order" 9 We do not expect however to observe exactly the same degree of online censorship and control in all the aforementioned states. The restrictions imposed on the free flow of information and media control may vary. The study of some "online" patterns relevant to the online filtration or restriction of access may reveal interesting "offline" patterns in terms of further control, oppression or authoritarian behaviour. 4 It is this lack of absolute control that make me prefer not to use the term "totalitarian" when referring to particular states. Furthermore, in the era of continuous globalising processes, the principles of collaboration, freedom and openness constitute some of the basic raw materials necessary for building up a sustainable global economy. It has been assumed that even governments that are repressive regarding Internet freedom will eventually become fairer "players". This is precisely because the Internet is a necessary precondition of sustained and strong economic development. Does this mean that even repressive governments will eventually follow the "liberal" paradigm? In other words, can globalisation require the aforementioned states to start rethinking their strict Internet policies just because the opposite may have costly economic impacts? This is the topic Morozov deals with when he raises the dictators' dilemma 10 . The argument can be summarised as: either the repressive governments keep themselves out of the "digital game" by controlling freedom and Internet use, taking the risk to experience negative economic impacts; or, they relax the restrictions, taking the risk to reluctantly "invite" the citizens to develop anti-governmental activism and mobilisation by using the social media and the Internet in general.
In general, Morozov is sceptical towards the idea that the Internet promotes democracy. He takes a more "cyber-realistic" point of view. The idea though that the Internet is inherently pro-democratic has been supported by examples all over the world. Authoritarian governments can be in danger when citizens use the Internet and social media such as Facebook and Twitter to co-ordinate revolutionary actions. Can these examples support the idea of a close connection between Internet and democracy?
The recent events in Tunisia and Egypt celebrated the use of social media. It is broadly argued that it is the Internet 11 that enabled the Tunisian youth to materialise part of the "Jasmine Revolution". The strict online censorship in Tunisia-additional sign of an authoritarian rule?-did not prevent the digital expression of the opposition against a repressive government. Messages on Twitter and in various blogs were communicated with the aim to distribute information about the place and time in which particular protests were taking place. Protesters in Egypt, who flooded the streets of Cairo in January and February 2011 demanding an end to the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak, used a wide range of mediaincluding Twitter. Ishani argues that young Egyptian cyberactivists were preparing for years an online collaboration that eventually moved in the streets: by sending messages, using social media, "feeding" the international press with images and news, calling supporters etc. (Ishani 2011) . It seems that, in the case of Egypt, the social media are recognised as having played a significant role in supporting and triggering the offline protest that put an end to a 30 years authoritarian rule.
Although Egypt and Tunisia are the most recent cases in which the Internet assisted mobilisation among the citizens against an authoritarian rule, past examples can also be mentioned: the Burmese people also distributed messages through YouTube, Facebook and blogs (Castells 2008, 86) ; most recently the Red Shirt uprising in Thailand in Summer 2010 used electronic media to express opposition to the government; in Iran after the presidential 10 Morozov made long references to this issue at his speech delivered at the London School of Economics on 19 th January 2011 theorising the relation between digital freedom and democracy. 11 See the BBC report by Lewis on the BBC. elections in 2009, people used YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to spread information against the outcome of the elections in order to challenge the electoral results. The citizens' mobilisation is not only reflected in the context of the recent demonstrations that are heavily based upon the popular social media. It can also take place by using different tools of interaction and communication. Blogging for example; although further and systematic interpretation and research are required, because most blogs are void of political meaning, blogging has become in some cases a useful source of information. The case of the Chinese Butcher is characteristic: a social activist, the Chinese Butcher was made known for his efforts to upload several videos and communicate "hidden" information exposing the official misdeeds to public scrutiny. 12 In 2007, Burmese bloggers constructed their web pages to provide insights and information to the public despite the repressive control of information.
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It can be argued that the limitations imposed by authoritarian governments in relation to the free flow of information are exactly what triggers groups of activists to use online media to fight those limitations. But the question is to what extent this kind of mobilisation can bring considerable development in the political system itself; and whether, the online mobilisation can be regarded as an effective mechanism of democratisation in itself.
From an optimistic point of view, it can be argued that such technologies can become vehicles of political change for the reasons explained below.
First, they become a source of useful information within and outside the authoritarian state. But, in relation to our points regarding different degrees of censorship and Internet filtration, the effectiveness of this source of information depends heavily on the access allowed by the authoritarian regimes. Actions against authoritarianism gain a totally different meaning when they emerge from people within the repressive states. Would the social media act as mobilisation tools if people themselves do not realise the need for mobilisation? "Tweets don't overthrow governments; people do" (Morozov 2010) . Therefore, if it is not backed up by systematic evidence, the direct relation between the Internet and mobilisation can only be the result of speculation. It seems that social media do enable socialisation, but the mere existence of communication and socialisation cannot be sufficient conditions for further changes. Exercising pressure upon authoritarian order requires first, realisation of the need for opposition against the order, and second, careful and systematic selection of strategies to design such an opposition. As Bremmer indicates, "If technology has helped citizens pressure authoritarian governments in several countries, it is not because the technology created a demand for change. That demand must come from public anger at authoritarianism itself" (Bremmer 2010, 89) . The question whether such technology enables the materialisation of relevant demands has become the epicentre of interesting rhetoric following the recent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. 14 Second, by providing information, raising awareness and exposing signs of authoritarian order, the social media enable the creation of online forums of deliberation in whichtheoretically at least-social capital can emerge. These online forums can encourage engagement and facilitate collaboration. If sustained, they may succeed in what Putnam puts as: "broadening the participants' sense of self, developing the "I" into the "we"…" (Putnam 1995, 66) . I do not argue that the social interaction among like-minded citizens in Egypt can trigger necessarily a constructive dialogue. But, it is likely that the online forums provide the opportunity for citizens to realise their common interests and shared concerns, understand their common aims, their need to express their opposition and be involved in a process of deliberation regarding the "what to do" These are elements that can enforce further public engagement. The online dialogue and interaction-if sustained-can produce the need for collective action or become the starting point of smooth political participation depending on the circumstances under which further organised action may emerge. The creation of a "public sphere", an online space of deliberation, may be the hope for the online activists who use online tools to fight for democracy. This public sphere, however, may emerge more easily outside the authoritarian state and beyond the limits of an authoritarian rule.
Therefore, third, the online interaction becomes more important when it can support the creation of a broader, global public sphere by spreading news around the world and raising awareness about the conditions under which authoritarian order is exercised in a particular state. At this stage it would be difficult to suggest that a kind of "bridging" social capital 15 can emerge, but shared interests can certainly be communicated among people who find ways to exchange ideas. The development of an online dialogue can bring together shared interests and concerns in such a way that the Internet becomes the meeting point for the fighters for democracy. Therefore, I suggest that the Internet enabled media do not act necessarily as guarantors of democracy. They may, however, empower constructive relations between diasporic communities by raising awareness and by contributing to the initiation of a dialogue that may or may not result in willingness for further participation and action.
Furthermore, theorisation over the potential power of social media should not raise our expectations about dramatic changes in the political order. Challenging the authoritarian rule or starting the transition towards democracy depends on several factors. The social media in Egypt became the driving force of the expressed opposition against Mubarak's government, but the question about what comes next remains unanswered. The demand of the Egyptian people for free elections and a free press cannot guarantee whether in the future Egypt will be directed towards religious fundamentalism or towards the interconnected globalised world and a more democratic government. 16 What is relevant for the purposes of this paper is the fact that, although the social media were a very useful tool in coordinating the Egyptian uprising, the ultimate outcome of the uprising will be determined by other, "offline" and more traditional considerations.
In addition, instead of embarking upon utopian dialectics over the power of the social media as democratisation forces, a dystopian perspective still calls for further consideration. From a pessimistic point of view, the same tools that can generate opposition 15 Putnam differentiates "bridging" social capital from "bonding" social capital. While "bonding" refers to "inward looking, and tend to reinforce excluding identities" while "bridging" refers to "outwardlooking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages" (Putnam 2000, 22) . 16 See for example Rachman's article in the FT.
to authoritarianism and possibly freedom wars, can also operate in the opposite direction: extreme groups can produce online propaganda and eventually support the authoritarian order rather than trying to challenge it. Such social media function both as "opening spaces for democracy as well as autocracy" (Schmidt and Cohen 2010, 75) .
To conclude, the online social media have a dyadic nature and effect. On the one hand, there is the hope that the social media will initiate a dialogue and generate opposition against the authoritarian rule. As such they can be seen as eclipsed tools for democratisation, supporting the creation of a community ethos. The emergence of such an ethos, however, cannot in itself open the way to freedom and promotion of democracy. The social media can become vehicles of democratisation only when such an ethos is strong enough to produce participatory values that will alter the way in which oppressed people exchange views and collaborate actions. They can however become useful communication and collaboration tools used by democracy activists to sustain democratic campaigns. On the other hand, the same potential vehicles of democratisation can be used as mechanisms for monitoring citizens, spreading propaganda and sustaining authoritarian orders. These new media require further examination because they lie on a paradoxical synthesis of "good" and "evil": Their dyadic nature as vehicles of democracy and openness and as tools of scrutiny and control does not allow definite conclusions over their future role as instruments of democratisation. Let us hope that they can become, hopeful representations of a deeper need for freedom, openness and democracy, even catalytic tools of detotalitarisation while opening the way against sporadic authoritarian behaviours. The only certainty about their uncertain contribution to freedom and democracy is that, given their instantaneous and ubiquitous availability, they can accelerate the arrival of the future. But the future remains highly uncertain, as it always has.
